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A New Institutional Approach to Japanese Firms’ Foreign Direct 
Investment under Free Trade Agreements* 
Hikari Ishido† 
 
1. Importance of foreign direct investment for development under free trade 
agreements 
The world economy is globalizing, and economic activities increasingly have a 
supranational dimension. Industrial products, once manufactured in stand-alone 
factories, are now manufactured with visible materials, physical assets, and invisible 
technical know-how, and these inputs are sourced from nearly every part of the globe. 
Factories themselves are also frequently located outside of their home economies, even 
though these factories are viewed as internal to a single business entity (Dunning, 1992). 
This type of global economic activity, which stretches across borders, has been labeled 
foreign direct investment (FDI). The scale of FDI in Asian economies has increased 
relative to that in economies in other parts of the world. FDI undertaken by 
multinational firms (MNFs) as supranational entities is therefore a key phenomenon of 
economic globalization, and so it is a timely and important topic for research. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. The next section addresses theoretical 
perspectives on FDI and FTA. Section 3 is dedicated to making some empirical 
observations of firm-size distributions. Section 4 describes statistical analyses of the 
linkage between FDI and FTA. Section 5 concludes this paper and discusses some 
policy implications. 
 
 
                                                   
* This paper is a part of the output from the research group “Economic Analysis of Trade 
Agreements” at IDE-JETRO. 
†Professor of international economics, Faculty of Law, Politics and Economics, Chiba 
University, Japan. 
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2. Theoretical perspectives on FDI and FTA 
In the 1950s, the countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) adopted industrialization policies aimed at rapid economic development. 
Both import substitution and export-oriented industrialization policy measures were 
adopted by national governments in ASEAN countries. Starting in the late 1980s, these 
economies experienced a period of economic “take-off,” with high growth rates of 
sometimes more than 10 percent per annum. This rapid economic growth was sustained, 
to a large degree, by international capital inflows, employment generation, and 
technology transfer, all of which were facilitated by the surge of FDI into these ASEAN 
economies by MNFs. Malaysia, for example, has been enjoying FDI-driven economic 
development over the past three decades, as have many of its neighbors. 
Portfolio investment inflows and bank lending to Asian countries affected by 
the so-called Asian financial crisis of 1997 are two other important types of capital 
flows. It is notable that, with the exception of Indonesia, FDI inflows were positive 
during and after the crisis period, while portfolio investment and bank lending exhibited 
net outflows. The unexpected occurrence of the crisis in mid-1997, triggered by the 
sharp devaluation of Thai baht, caused a net outflow of portfolio investment from the 
Thai economy as well as from other ASEAN economies, including those of Indonesia 
and Malaysia. However, FDI flows largely stayed positive. MNFs, as foreign direct 
investors in ASEAN countries, have also been streamlining their production operations 
in response to the changing economic circumstances following the crisis and free trade 
negotiations involving the ASEAN region. However, the difference in growth rates and 
sustainability of FDI relative to portfolio investment and bank lending raises an 
interesting question as to the factors behind the performance of FDI as distinct from 
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other types of capital flows. A systematic theoretical and applied investigation into the 
factors contributing to these differences is one clear motive for further research into 
FDI. 
The main objective of FDI by MNFs is to capture benefits in cost terms, 
exemplified by the existence of a cheap labor force in ASEAN economies. However, 
foreign governments often seek other benefits from FDI, including technology transfer 
and skill building of the labor force. As Tejima (1998) points out, MNFs aim to 
construct the most efficient international production network and are motivated by 
profit, whereas host countries desire FDI for the “full set” of production facilities, which 
become a “full package” within their own territories. In other words, MNFs shift, in 
certain economic circumstances, only their labor-intensive (and therefore 
low-value-added) production processes to foreign economies, in spite of host 
governments’ policies designed to attain economic development through the 
establishment of all-encompassing domestic industries. 
It is the right of MNFs to decide whether to undertake FDI. Depending on the 
policy circumstances, once FDI has been undertaken, MNFs themselves decide the 
types of operations to shift to the foreign economy. For example, Japanese MNFs 
shifted much of their production facilities abroad, mainly to the neighboring East Asian 
economies (including ASEAN economies), after the appreciation of the Yen in the wake 
of the Plaza Accord in 1985. Unlike official development assistance, the decisions of 
MNFs regarding FDI behavior have been motivated primarily by their profit-seeking 
objectives, with profit obtained through cost reduction by FDI in ASEAN economies. 
The nature of FDI undertaken by MNFs and its effect on an Asian country’s economic 
development in the face of globalization are important topics of theoretical and 
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empirical research. 
The assumption of perfect markets underlies the analytical foundations of the 
conventional neoclassical theory of firm behavior. Empirically, however, firms in 
developing countries are known to engage in production activities in imperfect markets. 
They engage in their value-adding activities with incomplete knowledge of what would 
constitute the optimal set of corporate decisions. In general, imperfect information 
arising from economic agents’ bounded rationality—in terms of perception, calculation, 
and action—renders market functioning imperfect. In other words, price signals do not 
reflect the “true” opportunity costs of the raw materials, factors of production, and final 
products/services involved. The market-entry mode of FDI, too, may be chosen as a 
response to market imperfection, which would make the causes and effects of FDI very 
different those suggested by the conventional theories of FDI. 
Dunning’s (1992) so-called “eclectic framework” is a useful taxonomy of FDI 
determinants, approached according to the source of comparative advantages conducive 
to the choice of FDI. More specifically, the ownership-specific advantage, locational 
advantage, and internalization advantage are considered pertinent to FDI decisions by 
firms. With due consideration to this eclectic framework, an attempt is made to identify 
sources of comparative advantage that account for MNFs’ decisions to engage in FDI. 
MNFs’ motivations for undertaking FDI are also influenced by the FDI-related 
industrial policies of host economies. International free trade and investment regimes 
and negotiations involving the ASEAN region, including the concept of the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA) and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), are within 
the scope of analysis. It is therefore essential to be concerned with host governments’ 
historical and current policy attitudes in the international context of trade and 
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investment liberalization, before undertaking the firm-level study. Toward this end, a 
country-level analysis should precede firm-level analyses. 
According to Dunning (1992), the extent to which a given firm possesses its 
firm-specific assets (O-advantages) vis-à-vis firms of other nationalities in a particular 
market functions as a determinant of FDI. These O-advantages largely take the form of 
the privileged possession of intangible assets and those assets that arise as a result of the 
common governance of cross-border value-adding activities (Casson, 1986; Casson 
1987; Dunning, 1992). 
Assuming that the above conditions are favorable, another component of FDI 
determination is the extent to which the firm perceives it to be in its best advantage to 
add value to its O-advantages, rather than to sell them (or the right to use them) to 
foreign firms. These advantages are called I-advantages because market mechanisms are 
internalized by organizational fiat systems. This advantage can be interpreted as 
Williamson’s transaction cost argument, adapted to the specific context of FDI 
determinants. Then, assuming the above two conditions are favorable, the extent to 
which the global interests of the firm are served by creating or using its O-advantages in 
a foreign location functions as the third determinant of FDI. The distribution of these 
resources and capabilities (i.e., O-advantages) is assumed to be uneven and hence 
location-specific, that is, the “L-advantage” is critical in determining the geographies in 
which to utilize the O-advantage.1 
                                                   
1One criticism of the OLI paradigm is that it is eclectic in nature, with little original insight into the 
determinants of FDI because it derives from a variety of theoretical approaches: international trade 
theory, the theory of the firm, institutional theory and location theory. Despite being eclectic, it is 
comprehensive enough to incorporate the widely differing attributes of MNFs. It is therefore more 
useful than original, in a substantive sense. It is more useful as a taxonomic framework than it is 
applicable to particular circumstances of time and place determined by the MNFs involved. Another 
critique is submitted by Casson (1986, 1987), who points out that these OLI components are not 
mutually exclusive; as a matter of fact, O-advantages could be viewed as a special type of 
7 
 
 
3. Empirical analysis of Japanese firms’ FDI under FTAs 
An implication of the O-advantage theory is that there is firm-level heterogeneity: firms 
differ in terms of size and what know-how they possess. This firm-level heterogeneity is 
driven by market imperfection, since if the market were perfect, then all firms could 
perform the same production and engage in the same trade patterns. Indeed, FDI is a 
non-market solution to market imperfection.  
Melitz (2003) addresses the issue of firm-heterogeneity in the context of 
“export or not” decision by firms: trade liberalization should bring about more 
competitive market conditions, thereby increasing the minimum scale needed for firms 
to produce in the market, at the same time that it reduces barriers to export. This section 
extends analysis of this firm-level heterogeneity to the context of FDI and FTA, rather 
than trade and FTA, which was addressed by Melitz (2003). Put differently, L-advantage 
in the OLI framework is created by FTAs, and this entails differences in firm sizes. 
From a new institutional perspective, FDI is undertaken as a response to market 
imperfection (imperfect competition as well as imperfect information2) surrounding 
investing firms. The role of FTA, then, is to reduce the degree of such market 
imperfection, particularly for medium and small-sized enterprises (SMEs). But 
industrial agglomeration (as a locational advantage in terms of Dunning’s OLI 
framework) is also important for realizing “synergy” or economies of scope by 
investment. 
Japan’s bilateral Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) examined in this 
study are as follows: Japan–Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA, which 
came into effect in 2002); Japan–Mexico EPA (2005); Japan–Malaysia EPA (2006); 
Japan–Chile EPA (2007); Japan–Thailand EPA (2007); Japan–Indonesia EPA (2008); 
Japan–Philippines EPA (2008); and Japan–Vietnam EPA (2009).3 Of these EPAs, six are 
FTAs with Asian countries, and two are with South-American countries (as will be 
                                                                                                                                                     
I-advantages. This critique supports the view that economic determinants of FDI can be divided into 
two sorts of advantages: those external to firms (L-advantages) and those internal to them (O- and/or 
I-advantages). 
2 Stiglitz (2005) underscores the greater degree of information imperfection faced by smaller-scale 
firms. 
3All-ASEAN Japan EPA is not considered in this study. 
8 
 
discussed later). 
As Melitz (2003) suggested, firm heterogeneity should be addressed: Only a 
part of firms export, and, likewise, only a part of firms undertake FDI. Exporting firms 
have larger scale and higher productivity than non-exporting firms. Likewise, firms 
undertaking FDI have larger scale and higher productivity than those firms not 
undertaking FDI. In this context, the impacts of trade liberalization on firms can be 
summarized as follows: Firms with large scale and high productivity expand production 
through exporting while low-productivity firms exit from the market, which increases 
sectoral-level productivity. Our research hypothesis is that after FTA, it becomes easier 
for smaller-scale firms to undertake FDI. The year that an FTA comes into effect is 
considered as part of the before-FTA period in our analyses. 
The analytical method is as follows. A database of investments by Japanese 
firms is constructed by country. The capital stock listed in the database is converted into 
equivalent US dollars. For the data, the analysis draws on the firm-level data released 
each year by Toyokeizai Shimposha, a publisher in Japan. Fixed exchange rates from 
local currencies to the US dollar are applied to convert all amounts to US dollars. 
Figures 1–8 show the Kernel density estimation of capital stock distribution for 
all the investing Japanese firms listed in the database4. The vertical axis measures the 
kernel density (labeled “kdensity”) of the capital size (in logarithmic form). Figure 1 is 
for Singapore. At the graphical level, the peak after FTA is moved slightly to the left, 
that is, the most frequent firm-size is smaller after FTA than it was before FTA. 
Figure 1. Kernel density estimation of capital stock distribution for the investing 
Japanese firms (recipient country: Singapore) 
                                                   
4Statistical analysis by sector remains infeasible due to the low number of observations. 
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Source: Calculated by author from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
 Figure 2 is for Mexico. As shown, the average of the distribution seems to have 
shifted rightward after the FTA. 
 
Figure 2. Kernel density estimation of capital stock distribution for the investing 
Japanese firms (recipient country: Mexico) 
 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
Figure 3 is for Malaysia. It seems the peak after the FTA is to the left of the one before 
the FTA. 
 
Figure 3. Kernel density estimation of capital stock distribution for the investing 
Japanese firms (recipient country: Malaysia) 
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Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
 Figure 4 is for Chile. As shown, the peak of the size distribution after the FTA 
is clearly to the left of the one before the FTA with Chile. For Mexico and Chile as the 
locations for investment in the Americas, synergy and industrial agglomeration may still 
not be fully achieved. Thus, smaller-scale firms might have to move later than 
larger-scale firms under the FTA. 
 
Figure 4. Kernel density estimation of capital stock distribution for the investing 
Japanese firms (recipient country: Chile) 
 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
 Figure 5 is for Thailand. It seems that the average size of paid-up capital after 
the FTA is located slightly to the left of the average before the FTA. 
 
Figure 5. Kernel density estimation of capital stock distribution for the investing 
Japanese firms (Recipient country: Thailand) 
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Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
 Figure 6 is for Indonesia. Two peaks appear in the distribution after the FTA, 
and the average size of paid-up capital cannot be seen clearly. 
 
 
Figure 6. Kernel density estimation of capital stock distribution for the investing 
Japanese firms (recipient country: Indonesia) 
 
 Figure 7 is for the Philippines. The peak of the distribution after the FTA 
between the Philippines and Japan is located to the left of the one before the FTA. 
 
Figure 7. Kernel density estimation of capital stock distribution for the investing 
Japanese firms (recipient country: Philippines) 
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Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
 Figure 8 is for Vietnam. The peak after the FTA is located to the left of the one 
before the FTA. The variance after the FTA seems to be bigger than the one before the 
FTA. Overall, the results are mixed in terms of statistical significance and also in terms 
of the direction of change. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Kernel density estimation of capital stock distribution for the investing 
Japanese firms (recipient country: Vietnam) 
 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
4. Statistical test of the average and variance of size distributions 
Next, we statistically analyze the differences in means and variances of the size 
distributions. The statistical test of differences in firm-size average is presented first. 
Tables 1–8 show the results. Table 1 is for Singapore. As shown, the magnitude of the 
t-value is below 2.0, meaning that there is no statistically significant difference before 
and after the FTA. 
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Table 1. Two-sample t test of difference in averages with the assumption of equal 
variances for Singapore 
   Group |     Obs.        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       0 |     701    296.7191    138.3179     3662.16    25.15152    568.2868 
       1 |     260    914.5755    881.5757    14214.98   -821.3931    2650.544 
combined |     961    463.8811    258.8098    8023.105   -44.01721    971.7794 
    diff |           -617.8563     582.546               -1761.068    525.3557 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -1.0606 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      959 
Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.1446         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2891          Pr(T > t) = 0.8554 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
 Table 2 is for Mexico. Just as in the case of Singapore, the t-value is not high 
enough to indicate a statistically significant change in the average of paid-up capitals 
after the FTA. 
 
Table 2. Two-sample t test of difference in averages with the assumption of equal 
variances for Mexico 
   Group |     Obs.        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       0 |     160    56.47558    26.65178    337.1213    3.838423    109.1127 
       1 |     139    622.1824    547.1075    6450.302   -459.6152     1703.98 
combined |     299     319.463    254.7732    4405.441   -181.9196    820.8457 
    diff |           -565.7068    510.6131               -1570.585    439.1713 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -1.1079 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      297 
Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.1344         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2688          Pr(T > t) = 0.8656 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
 Table 3 is for Malaysia. Since the t value (-3.0568) has magnitude larger than 2, 
there is a structural change in the average value of paid-up capital. 
 
Table 3. Two-sample t test of difference in averages with the assumption of equal 
variances for Malaysia 
   Group |     Obs.        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       0 |     591    21.02851     12.1144    294.5069   -2.764081    44.82109 
       1 |      96    259.3725    179.1661    1755.462   -96.31721    615.0622 
combined |     687    54.33422    27.19797    712.8774    .9329555    107.7355 
    diff |            -238.344    77.97199               -391.4368    -85.2512 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -3.0568 
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Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      685 
Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0012         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0023          Pr(T > t) = 0.9988 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
 Table 4 is for Chile. Since the t-value (-3.1350) has magnitude larger than 2, 
the average has changed after the FTA. 
 
Table 4. Two-sample t test of difference in averages with the assumption of equal 
variances for Chile 
 Group |     Obs.        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       0 |      37    57.83767    18.75039    114.0542    19.81012    95.86523 
       1 |       9    4464.685     2955.47     8866.41   -2350.641    11280.01 
combined |      46    920.0469    609.8865    4136.451   -308.3275    2148.421 
diff |           -4406.847    1405.675               -7239.799   -1573.895 
 diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -3.1350 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       44 
Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0015         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0031          Pr(T > t) = 0.9985 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
 Table 5 is for Thailand. The t value is not large enough for statistical 
significance. 
 
Table 5. Two-sample t test of difference in averages with the assumption of equal 
variances for Thailand 
   Group |     Obs.        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       0 |    1362    40.02701    28.64468     1057.14    -16.1655    96.21952 
       1 |     345    90.40615    80.31654    1491.814   -67.56717    248.3795 
combined |    1707    50.20909    28.02533    1157.891    -4.75855    105.1767 
    diff |           -50.37914    69.79867               -187.2792    86.52092 
 diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -0.7218 
Ho: diff = 0                                 degrees of freedom =     1705 
Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.2353         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4705          Pr(T > t) = 0.7647 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
Table 6 is for Indonesia. The t value is not large enough in magnitude for 
statistical significance. 
 
Table 6. Two-sample t test of average with the assumption of equal variances for 
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Indonesia 
   Group |     Obs.        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       0 |     584    41.62801    25.78878    623.2141   -9.022233    92.27824 
       1 |     231    6.829229    .7304664    11.10213    5.389968     8.26849 
combined |     815    31.76479    18.48417    527.6897   -4.517453    68.04704 
   diff |         34.79878    41.02229                -45.7233    115.3209 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   0.8483 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      813 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8017         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3965          Pr(T > t) = 0.1983 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
 Table 7 is for the Philippines. As shown, the t-value for the test of average 
difference is low, and so the average size of the firm does not seem to have changed 
after the FTA. 
 
Table 7. Two-sample t test of difference in averages with the assumption of equal 
variances for Philippines 
   Group |     Obs.        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       0 |     348    7.253982    .9954866    18.57056    5.296035    9.211929 
       1 |      42    5.661777    2.086904    13.52468    1.447189    9.876364 
combined |     390    7.082513    .9158915    18.08741    5.281796     8.88323 
    diff |            1.592205    2.957271               -4.222076    7.406486 
  diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                   t =   0.5384 
Ho: diff = 0                                 degrees of freedom =      388 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.7047         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.5906          Pr(T > t) = 0.2953 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
 Table 8 is for Vietnam. As shown, there is no statistically significant change in 
the average size of the firm (as characterized by paid-up capital) after the FTA. 
 
Table 8. Two-sample t test of difference in averages with the assumption of equal 
variances for Vietnam 
   Group |     Obs.        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       0 |     407    674.9663    663.3645    13382.88   -629.0917    1979.024 
       1 |     180    11.83821    3.970356    53.26792    4.003489    19.67294 
combined |     587    471.6221    459.9493    11143.69   -431.7277    1374.972 
    diff |            663.1281    997.9795               -1296.931    2623.187 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                t =   0.6645 
Ho: diff = 0                                 degrees of freedom =      585 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
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 Pr(T < t) = 0.7467         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.5067          Pr(T > t) = 0.2533 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
 Next, we test whether the variance of the distribution has changed after FTA, 
using the F-test for equality of variances. Tables 9–16 show the results. Because in 
Table 9, the F-value of the ratio (0.0664) is not large enough, the variance is not 
significantly changed. 
 
Table 9. Variance ratio test for Singapore 
   Group |     Obs.        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       0 |     701    296.7191    138.3179     3662.16    25.15152    568.2868 
       1 |     260    914.5755    881.5757    14214.98   -821.3931    2650.544 
combined |     961    463.8811    258.8098    8023.105   -44.01721    971.7794 
 ratio = sd(0) / sd(1)                                         f =   0.0664 
Ho: ratio = 1                                degrees of freedom = 700, 259 
Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1             Ha: ratio > 1 
  Pr(F < f) = 0.0000         2*Pr(F < f) = 0.0000           Pr(F > f) = 1.0000 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
 Table 10 is for Mexico. The result of the test is not statistically significant since 
the F-value (0.0027) is not high enough. 
 
Table 10. Variance ratio test for Mexico 
   Group |     Obs.        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       0 |     160    56.47558    26.65178    337.1213    3.838423    109.1127 
       1 |     139    622.1824    547.1075    6450.302   -459.6152     1703.98 
combined |     299     319.463    254.7732    4405.441   -181.9196    820.8457 
    ratio = sd(0) / sd(1)                                         f =   0.0027 
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 159, 138 
    Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1 
  Pr(F < f) = 0.0000         2*Pr(F < f) = 0.0000           Pr(F > f) = 1.0000 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
 Table 11 is for Malaysia. The result is not statistically significant. 
 
Table 11. Variance ratio test for Malaysia 
   Group |     Obs.        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       0 |     591    21.02851     12.1144    294.5069   -2.764081    44.82109 
       1 |      96    259.3725    179.1661    1755.462   -96.31721    615.0622 
combined |     687    54.33422    27.19797    712.8774    .9329555    107.7355 
    ratio = sd(0) / sd(1)                                         f =   0.0281 
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Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom =  590, 95 
    Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1 
  Pr(F < f) = 0.0000         2*Pr(F < f) = 0.0000           Pr(F > f) = 1.0000 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
 Table 12 is for Chile. The F value to be tested is 0.0002, which is not high 
enough to make the test statistically significant. 
 
Table 12. Variance ratio test for Chile 
   Group |     Obs.        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       0 |      37    57.83767    18.75039    114.0542    19.81012    95.86523 
       1 |       9    4464.685     2955.47     8866.41   -2350.641    11280.01 
combined |      46    920.0469    609.8865    4136.451   -308.3275    2148.421 
    ratio = sd(0) / sd(1)                                         f =   0.0002 
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom =    36, 8 
Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1 
  Pr(F < f) = 0.0000         2*Pr(F < f) = 0.0000           Pr(F > f) = 1.0000 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
Table 13 is for Thailand. As the F value (0.5022) is not high enough, the result 
is not statistically significant. 
 
Table 13. Variance ratio test for Thailand 
   Group |     Obs.        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       0 |    1362    40.02701    28.64468     1057.14    -16.1655    96.21952 
       1 |     345    90.40615    80.31654    1491.814   -67.56717    248.3795 
combined |    1707    50.20909    28.02533    1157.891    -4.75855    105.1767 
    ratio = sd(0) / sd(1)                                         f =   0.5022 
Ho: ratio = 1                                   degrees of freedom = 1361, 344 
    Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1 
  Pr(F < f) = 0.0000         2*Pr(F < f) = 0.0000           Pr(F > f) = 1.0000 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
 Table 14 is for Indonesia. The F-value for the ratio (3.2e+03, or 3.2 x 103) is 
large enough to make this test statistically significant; thus, it seems that there was a 
change in variance after the FTA. 
 
Table 14. Variance ratio test for Indonesia 
   Group |     Obs.        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       0 |     584    41.62801    25.78878    623.2141   -9.022233    92.27824 
       1 |     231    6.829229    .7304664    11.10213    5.389968     8.26849 
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combined |     815    31.76479    18.48417    527.6897   -4.517453    68.04704 
    ratio = sd(0) / sd(1)                                         f =  3.2e+03 
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 583, 230 
    Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1 
  Pr(F < f) = 1.0000         2*Pr(F > f) = 0.0000           Pr(F > f) = 0.0000 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 Table 15 is for the Philippines. The F-value of the ratio (1.8854) is high enough 
for the degrees of freedom in this test, and therefore the variance change is taken as 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 15. Variance ratio test for Philippines 
   Group |     Obs.        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       0 |     348    7.253982    .9954866    18.57056    5.296035    9.211929 
       1 |      42    5.661777    2.086904    13.52468    1.447189    9.876364 
combined |     390    7.082513    .9158915    18.08741    5.281796     8.88323 
    ratio = sd(0) / sd(1)                                         f =   1.8854 
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom =  347, 41 
    Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1 
  Pr(F < f) = 0.9925         2*Pr(F > f) = 0.0150           Pr(F > f) = 0.0075 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
 Table 16 is for Vietnam. The change in variance is statistically significant for 
Vietnam since the F-value is large enough.  
  
Table 16. Variance ratio test for Vietnam 
   Group |     Obs.        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       0 |     407    674.9663    663.3645    13382.88   -629.0917    1979.024 
       1 |     180    11.83821    3.970356    53.26792    4.003489    19.67294 
combined |     587    471.6221    459.9493    11143.69   -431.7277    1374.972 
    ratio = sd(0) / sd(1)                                         f =  6.3e+04 
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 406, 179 
    Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1 
  Pr(F < f) = 1.0000         2*Pr(F > f) = 0.0000           Pr(F > f) = 0.0000 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
The results are summarized in Table 17. The results are mixed, to say the least. 
For Malaysia and Chile, the test for average difference is significant. For Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Vietnam, the test for the difference in variance is significant. For all 
other countries, the results are not statistically significant.  
 
Table 17. Result of the statistical test on the difference of firm-size distribution (in 
19 
 
terms of paid-up capital stock) 
FTA partner 
country 
Test for the 
difference of mean 
Test for the 
difference of 
variance 
Singapore Not significant Not significant 
Mexico Not significant Not significant 
Malaysia Significant Not significant 
Chile Significant Not significant 
Thailand Not significant Not significant 
Indonesia Not significant Significant 
Philippines Not significant Significant 
Vietnam Not significant Significant 
Source: Calculated from Toyokeizai Shimposha’s database. 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper has examined the determinants of FDI under FTAs from a new institutional 
perspective. The statistical analysis of FDI at the aggregate level reveals that there is 
some evidence of “structural changes” after FTAs in terms of the investing firms’ 
paid-up capital stock. The statistical test for changes in the average and variance of the 
size distribution confirms this in the case of FTAs with Asian partner countries. Overall, 
it seems that the impact of FTA on the size of the investing firms is somewhat 
non-linear. 
As for FTAs with South American countries (Mexico and Chile), it seems the 
existence of FTAs seems to promote larger-scale FDIs in order to establish industrial 
agglomeration. These results remain correlational instead of causal, and more statistical 
analyses is needed for further understanding. Among policy implications, participating 
firms should consider institutional aspects of FTAs, such as size as a determinant of FDI. 
Theoretically speaking, FDI is a non-market solution to market imperfection. To adapt 
to the local business environment, firms are seen to change in size. The empirical 
observations and the results of the statistical tests are only partially in line with the 
theoretical hypothesis. Future work along this line is therefore much needed, 
particularly with regard to firm heterogeneity as characterized by firm size. 
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